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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No,

920401-CA

v.

:

DENNY ALVAREZ,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated
robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court, in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A.
Lewis, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court improperly admit the testimony

of a police officer regarding the findings of a police
fingerprint examination?

While the trial court's determination

of admissibility of evidence is ultimately a question of law and
is reviewed for correctness,

,f

[the reviewing court] reverse[s]

only if [it] conclude[s] that [the trial court] acted
unreasonably in striking the balance".
P.2d 774, 781-82 n.3 (Utah 1991).

State v. Ramirez, 817

2.

Has petitioner demonstrated, through the assertion

of fresh instances of deficient performance, that his trial
counsel was ineffective?

In making a determination as to whether

counsel has rendered ineffective assistance, an appellate court
should consider the totality of the evidence in assessing whether
(1) counsel's performance was deficient and (2) there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 1990)-

When the

question of trial counsel's ineffectiveness is raised for the
first time on appeal and the appellate court's review is confined
to the trial court record, the court determines a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law.

State v.

Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990).

Following a jury trial, defendant

was convicted of the offense charged (R. 69). The trial court
sentenced defendant to a term of five years to life imprisonment.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At about 11:00 a.m. on September 7, 1991, defendant
Denny Alvarez entered the Smith's Food King, located at 8th South
and 9th East, approached the customer service booth, where
Vanessa Milton was working, and demanded "six fifties" (R. 18386).

Ms, Milton asked defendant for the money from which she

would make the change, but defendant, who had some wadded up
money in his hand, kept saying, "Just give me the money" (R. 187,
197-98, 271-76).

Upon her refusal to respond after several such

demands, defendant pulled up his shirt and showed to Ms. Milton
what appeared to her to be the handle of a gun or a knife, but
mostly likely the latter, sticking out from the waist of
defendant's pants (R. 187-88, 203). Alarmed, Ms. Milton reached
for the intercom and called the store manager for assistance (R.
188).
Just as Ms. Milton called for assistance, defendant
reached through the glass partition, across the counter and
attempted to turn the key in the money drawer (R. 188-89).
Defendant's reach across the counter and grab for the keys to
open the drawer was witnessed by another employee at the customer
service booth, Cherice Lucero, who was then standing directly
behind Ms. Milton (R. 213-215).

Ms. Milton immediately called

security, and defendant fled (R. 189). After the incident, Ms.
Milton "fell apart," shaking and crying, reactions also witnessed
by Ms. Lucero (R. 191, 216).

3

Defendant fled to a waiting car, parked in the fire
lane about forty to fifty yards from the front of the store (R.
228, 232, 272). A couple of Smith's employees, including the
manager, Phillip Bair, prevented the car from leaving, but then
shortly removed defendant from the passenger seat (R. 229, 272).
Officer Mark Scharman of the Salt Lake County Police
Department responded to a call and arrived at the Smith's within
minutes (R. 237-38).

After arresting defendant, officer Scharman

located a knife between the passenger seat and the passenger door
(R. 240). A syringe also fell out of the car at that time (R.
247).

In response to officer Scharman's request, defendant

identified himself as "Joseph Madrid" and gave a juvenile age (R.
242).

Officer Scharman also found $ 4.61 in defendant's pants

(R. 247). At trial, Ms. Milton identified the knife as the one
which she had seen sticking out of defendant's pants (R. 190-91).
Defendant took the stand and identified himself as
"Denny Manuel Alvarez" and stated that he was twenty years old
(R. 264). He also admitted, on direct examination, that for five
days before the attempted robbery he had been "partying and
drinking and doing drugs [heroin and cocaine]," and, on the
morning of the offense, had intravenously injected himself with
drugs (R. 264-65, 273). Defendant claimed he went to the Smith's
to get "six fifties," meaning six fifty-cent pieces, because the
night before a man named "Jesse," with whom he occasionally did
drugs, bought two half-dollars he happened to have for two
dollars (R. 270-71, 286). He ran from the store only because he
4

saw Smith's' employees running towards him (R. 181). He denied
having reached across the counter or grabbed the keys (R. 280).
He also denied having a knife while in the Smith's food store or
having threatened Ms. Milton with a knife by lifting his shirt,
explaining instead that, as a result of his intense drug use, he
had become "wired out," lost weight and had continually to hike
up his pants to prevent them from falling down over his knees (R.
266, 268-69, 276-279).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony
about a police fingerprint report.
prejudiced:

However, defendant was not

(1) he offered testimony from which the jury would

have been bound to infer the same conclusions as that implied by
the hearsay, i.e., that he had lied to a police officer about his
name and age; (2) under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, the
fact of defendant's having lied was relevant to show
consciousness of guilt; (3) any prejudice accompanying a possible
negative aspersion about defendant's character from his having
lied did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence; and (4) evidence of guilt was sufficiently great that
there was no reasonable likelihood of a different result had the
challenged testimony been excluded.

5

Because defendant has failed to provide any evidence
about what an uncalled witness would have testified to at trial,
he has failed to make the required showing of prejudice in
support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED HEARSAY
EVIDENCE; HOWEVER, THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS
BECAUSE DEFENDANT OFFERED EVIDENCE ON DIRECT
EXAMINATION THAT NECESSARILY LED TO THE SAME
INFERENCE AS THAT CREATED BY THE HEARSAY, THE
EVIDENCE WAS RELEVANT AND MORE PROBATIVE THAN
PREJUDICIAL, AND EVIDENCE OF GUILT WAS
OVERWHELMING.
A.

Factual Background to Defendant's
Evidentiary Challenge.
Prior to trial defendant moved exclude any references

to his prior convictions, pursuant to rule 609, Utah Rules of
Evidence (R. 27). At the hearing on defendant's motion in
limine, the State stipulated that the prior convictions should be
suppressed, and the trial court granted the motion (R. 33).
At trial defendant moved to suppress Officer Scharman's
anticipated testimony that defendant had given him a false name
and age at the time of arrest (R. 219-20).l

Defendant argued

that the admission of the false name was evidence of a crime or
wrong, and was therefore inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah
Rules of Evidence (R. 220). Defendant acknowledged that the
court had already found the evidence relating to his name and age
1

The entire colloquy concerning defendant's objection to
Officer Scharman's anticipated testimony and the court's ruling
is attached at Appendix B.

6

admissible (presumably, at the previous hearing), but proffered
that he gave the officer the false name because he was on
probation for robbery (R. 220-21).

Defendant argued that any

attempt to explain why he gave the false information would
prejudice him by his having to reveal his probationary status (R.
221).

Therefore, he argued, reference to the false name and age

should also be suppressed under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
(R. 221).
In response to the trial court's inquiry, the State
argued that the giving of false information immediately following
the event was relevant evidence because it bore, in essence, on
defendant's guilty motive and it refuted, by the deviousness of
the act, the anticipated defense that he was too confused by
drugs to control his conduct and behavior (R. 222).
The trial court ruled that the evidence was relevant
and that "the probative value weighs [sic] the slight, if any,
prejudicial effect of the same" (R. 222). The court also found
that the evidence would not be excluded under rule 404(b) because
defendant had not been charged with giving a false information to
the police (R. 223). The court admonished Officer Scharman not
to make reference to defendant's probation, prior convictions or
criminal record (R. 223). Finally, the court noted that its
rulings did not compromise defendant strategically, allowing him
to either argue the falsity as evidence of his confusion, or to
otherwise explain its basis if he chose.

The trial court,

however, ordered the State to refrain from cross-examining

7

defendant on the question of probation if defendant chose this
latter route (R. 223-24).
Officer Scharman testified that at the time of the
arrest defendant gave him the name "Joseph Madrid" and a juvenile
age (R. 242) «2 When asked how he determined that a question
existed as to the name defendant had given him, Officer Scharman,
over defendant's hearsay objection, replied, "There was a
comparative fingerprint done from the print I took at the time of
the arrest versus some known prints of the defendant" (R. 24344).

From a supplementary record he discovered that the prints

of the individual he had arrested and defendant's known prints
were the same (R. 244). He also discovered, apparently from the
same report, that defendant was an adult (R. 244). In closing,
and on rebuttal, the State drew the reasonable inference, and
argued to the jury, that defendant had lied about his name and
age when Officer Scharman was attempting to identify him and
gather basic information about him (R. 322, 341).
B.

The Trial Court Erred in
Admitting Hearsay Evidence.
Rule 801(c), Utah Rules of Evidence, defines hearsay:

"Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."

"Hearsay is not

admissible except as provided by law or by these rules."
Evid. 802.
2

Utah R.

The entire colloquy concerning the Officer Scharman's
challenged testimony is attached at Appendix C.
8

The trial court's determination of admissibility of
evidence is ultimately a question of law and is reviewed for
correctness.

State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3

(Utah Apr. 23, 1991).
Officer Scharman testified to the substance of a police
report that was the product, in part, of a routine fingerprint
analysis.

No foundation was laid as to his personal knowledge of

the analysis, nor did the State attempt to introduce the report
itself, following the laying of a proper foundation,

see State

v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983) (setting out a
sufficient foundation, generally by the custodian of records, for
the admission of a booking officer's report under the thenapplicable business records exception to the hearsay rule).
Therefore, the State concedes defendant's claim on appeal that
the trial court erred in admitting Officer Scharman's testimony
concerning the supplementary records containing the results of
the comparative fingerprint analysis over his hearsay
objection.3

3

Defendant also argues that Officer Scharman's testimony
was in violation of rule 602, Utah Rules of Evidence (Appellant's
Brief at 10-11). While the policy of insuring evidentiary
reliability bears on both rule 602 and the hearsay rule, the
focus of the two rules is different. Rule 602 focuses on the
knowledge of the witness. The hearsay rules focus on the
knowledge of the declarant. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET B.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE J 602[01] at 602-5 (1992). Because
defendant did not make a specific objection based on rule 602,
this particular ground has not been adequately preserved for
appeal. State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here
a defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate
court will not consider that ground on appeal.")
9

C.

Defendant Was Not Prejudiced
by the Admission of Hearsay.
Notwithstanding the trial court's error in admitting

hearsay evidence, defendant suffered no prejudice entitling him
to a reversal of his conviction.

Rule 103(a), Utah Rules of

Evidence, provides, in pertinent part;

"Error may not be

predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is affected . . . ."

See State

v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1986) (noting, in dicta, that
even if the trial court had erred in excluding hearsay, it did
not materially prejudice the defendant where the defendant was
able to elicit other testimony for the same purpose, citing rule
103).
It is patent that if a party allows the jury to hear
certain evidence at one point, he cannot in good faith claim that
he was prejudiced by the same evidence at another point.

In

State v. Burk, No. 910404-CA, slip. op. (Utah App. October 23,
1992), Burk claimed that the witness's hearsay testimony
concerning his intent to "cut her up," prejudiced the jury,
notwithstanding the trial court's striking the testimony and
instructing the jury to disregard it.

Noting that Burk had

failed to object to substantially the same testimony from the
same witness, this Court rejected his argument, finding that the
objectionable testimony "was not so prejudicial as to deny Burk a
fair trial." Id. at 6.
The challenged testimony, alongside other unchallenged
testimony in this case, presents the same evidentiary picture as
10

in Burk,

Defendant objected to hearsay testimony that identified

him from fingerprint records, not as "Joseph Madrid," but as
"Denny Alvarez" (R. 243-44).
was erroneously admitted.

The State concedes that evidence

However, defendant did not first

object to Officer Scharman's testimony that defendant had given
him the name "Joseph Madrid" and a juvenile age when the
policeman first questioned him, and at the very beginning of his
direct examination defendant identified himself as "Denny Manuel
Alvarez" and that he was "twenty" years old (R. 242, 264). Since
the offense occurred on September 7, 1991, only 9 weeks before
the trial, the jury would have immediately recognized that
defendant was not a juvenile when he was arrested.

At no time

during the course of criminal proceedings did defendant move to
show that he had at any time used the name "Joseph Madrid."
Contrary to defendant's remarkable contention that "[n]o
competent or admissible evidence was offered to show that [the
name of 'Joseph Madrid' and the juvenile date of birth] were
indeed false" (Appellant's Brief at 11), the jury could only have
drawn the natural and reasonable inference that defendant
recognized himself as "Denny Alvarez" and that he had lied to
Officer Scharman.

Indeed, this Court should reject defendant's

claim of error more readily that it did the defendant's in Burk,
because in this case it was defendant himself who offered the
testimony that made clear that he had lied about his name and
age.

11

D.

Evidence of Defendant's Use of
a False Name and Acre was Relevant
to Show Intent under Rule 404(b).
Defendant argues that even if this Court should find

that the jury was entitled to infer that he had lied about his
name and age, such evidence was irrelevant and should not have
been admitted under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.

In

support he apparently argues (1) that the jury would have imputed
to him the committing of an uncharged crime, i.e., the giving of
false information to a police officer, and (2) evidence that he
lied tended to impugn his character, which was not at issue in
the case (Appellant's Brief at 12-13).
In State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989), the Utah
Supreme Court set out the analysis for admitting evidence of
other crimes or bad acts under rule 404(b):
,f

[E]vidence of a defendant's prior crimes or
bad acts is not admissible to show criminal
propensity in a criminal case. Such evidence
may be admitted only if the evidence has a
very high degree of probativeness with
respect to a particular element of the crime
charged and will not otherwise result in
undue prejudice. That rule has been carried
into our present rules of evidence by Rule
404(b) . . . .* However, Rule 404(b) also
states that prior crimes evidence is
A

Rule 404(b) provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
12

"admissible for other purposes
. . . . Thus,
evidence may be adduced to "establish any of
the constitutive elements of the crime of
which the defendant is accused in the case on
trial, even though such evidence tends to
prove that the defendant has committed other
crimes."
Id. at 963 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Accord, State

v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987).
Contrary to defendant's claim, however, his lying about his
name and age were relevant to his intent:
The use of a false name after the commission
of a crime is commonly accepted as being
relevant on the issue of consciousness of
guilt. See e.g., United States v. Bovle, 675
F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1982). In this regard, E.
Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 271(c), at
803 (3rd ed. 1984) provides:
"The wicked flee when no man pursueth."
Many acts of a defendant after the crime
seeking to escape the toils of the law
are uncritically received as admissions
by conduct, constituting circumstantial
evidence of consciousness of guilt and
hence of the fact of guilt itself. In
this class are flight from the scene of
from one's usual haunts after the crime,
assuming a false name . . . .
Kidd v. State, 748 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis
in the original) (footnotes omitted in the original) (finding
relevant the defendant's having given a fictitious name to police
officers asking the defendant to identify himself following a
high-speed chase in a case of aggravated robbery).

Accord, State

v. Chase, 799 P.2d 272, 275 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (finding

13

relevant under rule 401,5 Washington Rules of Evidence, the
defendant's giving a false name when first interviewed, because
"it tended to show consciousness of guilt, and thus to further
inferences of identity and criminal intent").

See also State v.

Sanchez, 11 Utah 2d 429, 432, 361 P.2d 174 (1961) (finding
relevant the defendant's first denying knowledge of the victim
and her mother in a statutory rape case, but later admitting
such.

The court stated:

"This evidence showing that upon being

confronted with inquiry about this crime [the defendant] first
was defensive and evasive by making denials, and later made
admissions of the truth inconsistent with them, was competent
evidence because it reasonably could be regarded as manifesting
an awareness of guilt and a desire to protect himself by
falsifying to mislead the officers in the investigation.")
Defendant lied to Officer Scharman about his name and
age.

Officer Scharman, arriving on the scene a few minutes after

the offense occurred, obviously did not witness defendant's
5

Rule 4 01, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the
state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
14

criminal acts (R. 238). Defendant might well have considered
denying his identity to avoid assuming responsibility for the
offense, even though he had been detained by Smith's employees
immediately following the attempted robbery.

The State did not

offer defendant's lying about his name and age for the purpose of
maligning his character, but, in essence, to demonstrate
defendant's consciousness of guilt through his deviousness (R.
222).

The trial court agreed, and, ruling prospectively,

properly found the evidence relevant both as to defendant's
motive and his lack of confusion, i.e., his deliberateness in
denying guilt (R. 222-23).
"Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a
particular element of a crime and is not offered merely to show
criminal predisposition, such evidence is not automatically
admissible under Rule 404(b).

Its tendency to lead the finder of

fact to an improper basis for decision must still be balanced
against its probative value and the need for such evidence in
proving a particular issue."
195 (Utah 1988).

State v. Schickles, 760 P.2d 291,

See also State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424,

426-27 (Utah 1989) (applying rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, to
determine the admissibility of prior bad act evidence by weighing
the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial
effect).6
6

Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in pertinent

part:
Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is
15

A determination of admissibility under rule 403 is a
fact-intensive question, delegated to the discretion of the trial
court and reviewed only for abuse of discretion.
Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 295-96 (Utah App. 1990).

State v.
Recognizing that

the determination of admissibility of evidence under rule 403 is
a matter of law, review is based on "whether . . . the trial
court's decision . . . was beyond the limits of reasonability."
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 241, 239-40 (Utah 1992) (citing
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781-82 n.3).
In Schickles, the court found that "clearly
prejudicial" evidence of the defendant's sexual abuse of the
victim was, nonetheless, admissible to show intent to kidnap
where the issue of intent was hotly contested.

Id., at 296.

In

State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), the court refused to
apply rules governing character traits where prejudicial evidence
was not offered to show a trait of defendant's character, but
rather consciousness of guilt. .Icl. at 65.
In this case the issue of defendant's culpable state of
mind was also in dispute.

Defendant denied that he reached

across the counter and tried to turn the key in the money draw,
or that he even entered the Smith's with a knife (R. 280).
Defendant explicitly denied that he intended to rob the Smith's
store (R. 283). Other than defendant's lying to Officer
Scharman, the State had available no other of defendant's

substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice . . . .
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statements on which to prove defendant's guilty state of mind.
The trial court found that the probative value of the evidence
outweighed the slight, if any, prejudicial effect, under rule 403
(R. 222). Considering the relevance of defendant's
prevarication, and the need for the evidence, weighed against the
relatively insignificant character effect of defendant's having
lied to the policeman, this Court should find the trial court
ruled properly.
Defendant also asserts that if the evidence of his
prevarication were admitted, the jury would impute to him the
offense of giving false information (Appellant's Brief at 12-13).
Such an imputation entails no serious prejudice under the facts
of this case. While lying to a police officer may, depending on
the facts, cast doubt on character, it does not on its face
announce an offense.

The trial court noted that defendant had

not been charged with the offense of giving false information to
a police officer7 and that the State was not treating such
information so as to suggest such an offense (R. 223). The trial
court, therefore, held that defendant's lying to a police officer
was not the "crime" contemplated by rule 404(b) (R. 223).
Defendant does not cite any evidence in this case, any facts that
would truly suggest that the average jurymember would have legal
knowledge of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990), or any legal
authority that would support his claim.
7

Indeed, apart from the

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-507 (1990), providing for the
intentional misleading of a police officer by giving a false
name, birthdate or address as a class C misdemeanor.
17

claim's general lack of merit, because defendant has failed to
supply any argument or legal authority in support of his claim,
this Court should decline to consider it.

State v. Amicone, 689

P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
E.

Defendant has Failed to Show that
Challenged Evidence was Substantially
More Prejudicial Than Probative under
Rule 403.
Defendant claims that even if the evidence of his lying

to a police officer were admissible under rule 404(b), it should
nonetheless have been excluded under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence because it was significantly more prejudicial than
probative.

In support he argues:

(1) that any inference a jury

might ordinarily and reasonably make concerning his giving false
information was absent in this case because the real reason,
which he did not have the opportunity to refute, was that he was
on probation; (2) the fact of his having lied to Officer
Scharman, when the accounts of the events within the Smith's
store were generally so similar, must have prejudiced the jury in
considering his intent; and (3) the manner in which his lying to
the police officer came into evidence, i.e., that the officer had
determined his identity through a comparison with "known prints,"
informed the jury of his prior criminal history (Appellant's
Brief at 15-18)•
1.

Denial of Opportunity to Refute
In making this argument defendant suggests that the

State should not be able to offer relevant evidence because he
would be compelled to prejudice his case by offering a truthful
18

explanation.

The argument is tantamount to saying that the State

should not be permitted to put on its case in chief because, if a
defendant takes the stand to rebut, he runs the risk of being
impeached.

Defendant asserts no constitutional right to be

insulated from impeachment through his own testimony.
In this case defendant did take the stand.

The trial court

recognized that defendant could explain his lying to Officer
Scharman by either offering his explanation or not offering it.
The trial court reasonably insulated defendant from any
prejudicial effect by admonishing the State to refrain from
cross-examining defendant on his prior convictions if he offered
his probation as an explanation (R. 223-24).

Thus, the risk of

explaining the true reason for his lying reasonably fell on
defendant, just as it would any defendant facing the risk of
taking the stand for fear of impeachment.

Defendant chose not to

explain his lying, and he should not now be permitted to complain
that he was prejudiced by a choice faced by any criminal
defendant.
2.

Prejudicial Effect of Prevarication on Intent
The State has argued that defendant's lying to Officer

Scharman was relevant to establishing defendant's culpable state
of mind and that the probative value of this evidence outweighed
the relatively trivial prejudicial effect that such evidence
might have had in influencing the jury on this point (Appellee's
Brief at 12-16).

Defendant is mistaken in stating that his

account and that of the State's witnesses was substantially the
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same, and therefore, the jury must have used the fact of his
prevarication to find he possessed a guilty mind.

In fact, the

accounts of defendant's actions given Smith's employees was
significantly different than defendant's account and were more
than sufficiemt to create a reasonable inference about
defendant's culpable state of mind (see Statement of Facts,
Appellee's Brief at 3-5).
3.

"Known Prints" Suggesting Prior Crimes
Defendant asserts that Officer Scharman's reference to

the source from which he learned defendant's identity gave the
jury notice of prior criminal activity which was prejudicial.
The argument is without merit.
An offhand reference to "known prints" hardly gives
notice of prior criminal activity comparable to that announced by
the defendant in State v. Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192 (Utah 1985), on
which defendant relies.

In that case the court held that the

trial court erred in allowing the defendant's statement,
regarding a ring discovered in a search of his vehicle, "[I]t may
have been there from a previous burglary."

JId. at 194. The

court found that the statement was inadmissible character
evidence which the defendant was unable rebut because he did not
testify, and was irrelevant to proving any element of the
particular burglary for which he was being tried,

.Id. at 194-95.

Similarly, neither State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987),
or Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989), also cited by defendant,
are apposite because the challenged evidence was clearly
20

irrelevant to the charges.

In DeAlo, this Court found the

marginal probative value of a California search warrant,
supporting affidavit and dope ledger, none of which were clearly
connected to the Utah offense, did not outweigh the prejudicial
implication that defendant was involved in a major cocaine
distribution scheme in California.

Ld. at 199.

In Featherson,

the court found the defendant's prior sexual assault convictions
and uncharged assault incidents, the most recent of which
occurred four years before the aggravated sexual assault charge
on which he was being tried, and interactions with two women
several hours before the occurrence of the offense, were all
irrelevant and unnecessary to prove the defendant's intent.

Id.

at 426-32.
In all of the cases on which defendant relies, cited
above, the prior crime evidence was clearly and definitively
brought to the jury's attention as such.

In this case, however,

the officer's reference to "known prints" does not clearly
suggest criminal activity.

There exist a number of reasons for

which any law-abiding individual might have his/her fingerprints
on file with the Bureau of Criminal Identification, i.e., under
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4-514 (Supp. 1992), any child care provider
would be required to supply fingerprints in order to obtain a
license.

Thus, defendant simply speculates that the reference to

known prints signals prior criminal activity.
Further, the officer's reference to "known prints" was
fleeting and not elaborated on. As opposed to authority on which
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defendant relies, a more fitting precedent relevant to his claim
is State v. Griffiths. 752 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988)-

In that case

the prosecutor unintentionally evoked a response from the
arresting officer which revealed the existence of an outstanding
warrant for the defendant's arrest in another unrelated matter.
"The witness's reference to the warrant was very brief and was
made only in passing, stating no details of the circumstances
which caused the warrant to issue or of the offense to which it
was related."

Id. at 883. Noting that the trial court obviated

any prejudice that might have resulted by immediately admonishing
the jury to disregard the testimony, the court found the error
harmless.

Ibid.
In this case no motion to strike was made, and on

appeal defendant does not suggest that the trial court was in
error in failing to admonish the jury.

Furthermore, considering

the distinct possibility that the jury might not even have
recognized the possible implication of prior criminality from so
casual a reference to "known prints," the trial court probably
minimized whatever prejudicial effect may have attached to the
statement by choosing not to draw attention to it at all.
F.

Any Error in Admitting Challenged
Evidence was Harmless Because
Defendant Testified to Eguivalent
Bad Acts and Evidence of Guilt
was Overwhelming.
"|[A]n erroneous decision to admit or exclude evidence

based on rule 403 cannot result in reversible error unless the
error is harmful."

Hamilton. 827 P.2d at 240 (citation omitted).
22

Elaborating on the harmless error standard, the court in Hamilton
said:
"Harmless" errors are "errors which,
although properly preserved below and
presented on appeal, are sufficiently
inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings." Although it
is somewhat difficult to state exactly when
an error is such that it would result in a
"reasonable likelihood" of a different
result, we have attempted to give a more
accurate definition of such an error in State
v, Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), where we
held, "For an error to require reversal, the
likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in
the verdict." id. at 920. . . .
In making this determination, we
consider a host of factors, including, among
others, the importance of the witness's
testimony to the prosecution's case and the
overall strength of the State's case. The
more evidence supporting the verdict, the
less likely there was harmful error.
Id. at 240 (citations omitted) (finding harmless any error that
might have occurred in admitting evidence that the defendant had
acted violently toward a witness on a prior occasion when the
great weight of evidence established guilt).
Any error resulting from the admission of challenged
testimony in this case was harmless. Any prejudice that might
have resulted from testimony which, while relevant, reflected on
defendant's character as a liar or suggested he had a criminal
background, was made insignificant by defendant's own expansive
admissions of his unrestricted drug use prior to the offense.
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Defendant testified that he was high on heroin and cocaine on the
morning of the offense and for the five days preceding (R. 26465):
MS., REMAL [Defense Counsel]: I want to draw
your attention and have you recall, if you
can, generally your activities between
September 1st and September 7th of this year*
Do you recall generally what you were doing?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I was with my friend
partying and drinking and doing drugs.
MS. REMAL: Now, when you say partying, what
do you mean? What does partying include?
DEFENDANT: Well, drinking beer, staying up
all night, partying. Just not worrying about
nothing but just getting high.
MS. REMAL: All right. Now, you mentioned
doing drugs. Were there some sort of
controlled substances that you were
consuming?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
MS. REMAL:

What?

DEFENDANT:

Cocaine and heroin.

MS. REMAL: And how often during that period
of time between September 1st and Sept€*mber
2nd, excuse me, 7th, would you say you
consumed or used some sort of drugs?
DEFENDANT:
(R. 264-65).

The whole time.

Defendant, through his own testimony, characterizes

himself not so much as one helplessly caught in the grip of
addiction, but rather a self-indulgent degenerate.

Alongside of

such self-characterization any prejudice accompanying the
challenged testimony pales.
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More significantly, the evidence supporting the jury's
guilty verdict was overwhelming.8

Ms. Milton, the Smith's

customer service employee, testified that when she refused to
give defendant the change he claimed he was asking for, he raised
his shirt exposing the handle of a weapon sticking out from his
pants while demanding, "Just give me the money" (R. 187-88).
Both Ms. Milton and Ms. Lucero, the other customer service
employee, testified that defendant then reached across the
counter, grabbed the keys to the money drawer and attempted to
open the drawer (R. 188-89, 218). When Ms. Milton called for
assistance, defendant ran from the store (R. 190). Officer
Scharman, who was on the scene within minutes of the offense,
located a knife between the door and the passenger seat in which
defendant had been sitting just minutes after defendant had fled
the scene (R. 240). Ms. Milton identified the knife as the one
with which defendant had threatened her (R. 190). Based on such
evidence, whatever the character aspersions that might have
attached to the admission of defendant's having lied or having
8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1990), providing for the
offense of aggravated robbery, states, in pertinent part as
follows:
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in
the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) . . . threatens to use a dangerous
weapon . . . .
•

•

« •

(3) For the purposes of this part, an act
shall be considered to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit . . . a robbery.
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been previously identified by the police, there is no reasonable
likelihood of a different outcome had such evidence been
excluded*
POINT II
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE
COURT WITH ANY EVIDENCE THAT AN UNCALLED
WITNESS MIGHT HAVE TESTIFIED FAVORABLY, HIS
CLAIM THAT HE WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
OF COUNSEL IS WITHOUT MERIT.
This court recently outlined the analysis applied to
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in State v.
Severance, 828 P.2d 1066 (Utah App. 1992):
[An appellate court] review[s] a
challenge of ineffective assistance of
counsel by first determining whether
counsel's performance was deficient and, if
so, determining whether the deficient
performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland
v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2064 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d
886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Oliver,
820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991).
A defendant "must prove that specific,
identified acts or omissions fall outside the
wide range of professionally competent
assistance. The claim may not be
speculative, but must be a demonstrative
reality." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A
defendant must then show that the deficient
performance was so prejudicial as to
"undermine confidence in the reliability of
the verdict." Id. Accord, Oliver, 820 P.2d
at 478. That is, a defendant must
demonstrate there was a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial.
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 n.26
(Utah 1990).
Id. at 1070 (emphasis added).

When the question of trial

counsel's ineffectiveness is raised for the first time on appeal
26

and the appellate court's review is confined to the trial court
record, the court determines a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel as a matter of law.

State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 487

(Utah App. 1991).
Tempiin is fully dispositive of defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

In Tempiin, the defendant

filed a motion for a new trial following his conviction, claiming
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel. At the
hearing on the motion he introduced evidence that his trial
counsel had failed to call two witnesses that would have provided
exculpatory testimony.

On appeal from the trial court's denial

of his motion, the defendant evidently included in the record
evidence concerning one of the witness's testimony, but not the
other's.

The court found that based on the record, defendant had

been denied effective assistance of counsel because counsel had
failed to interview and call to testify the exculpating witness.
However, the court also found that the defendant had failed to
meet his burden of showing that if the other witness had
testified there would have been a reasonable likelihood of a
different outcome because "[the defendant] [had] not provided
this court with any evidence concerning what [the other witness]
would have testified to if he had been called during trial."

Id.

at 188 n.26.
Defendant claims that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to call as
a witness "Jesse," the individual who bought two half-dollars
27

from him the night before the offense for two dollars, and whom
he claims on appeal is the individual who drove him to the
Smith's Food Store (Appellant's Brief at 20-23).9

Defendant

asserts Jesses would have provided supporting evidence concerning
his innocent intent.

However, defendant has failed to provide

this court with any evidence as to what Jesse's actual testimony
at trial would have been.

Thus, without considering whether

counsel's performance was deficient, defendant has failed to
failed to meet his burden on the second prong of the Strickland
test by his inability to show that he was prejudiced by the lack
of Jesse's testimony.

Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 n.26; Bundv v.

DeLand, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (holding that a reviewing
court need not consider whether counsel's performance was
deficient if it is easier to dispose of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because of lack of sufficient
prejudice).

The strength of this conclusion is further bolstered

by the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt (Appellee's
Brief at 22-24).

See Severance, 828 P.2d at 1070 (finding no

reasonable probability of a different result at trial where the
record did not indicate whether a witness would have testified
more favorably at trial, and evidence against the defendant was
overwhelming).

In sum, this Court should reject defendant's

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
9

Defendant confuses the record in considering "Jesse" and
the individual, a person "kind of like an uncle," who drove him
to the Smith's to be the same person. The manner in which
defendant refers to these persons makes clear that they are
different people (R. 271-72, 286).
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Cc?ur-t to affirm defendant's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

y

day of November,

1992.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX A

76-6-302

CRIMINAL CODE

76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing
robbery, he:
.
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as denned in Section
76-1-601; or
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in the
course of committing a robbery5, if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during
the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission
of a robbery.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparentfromthe context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was
apparent from the context within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or further
statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form in which it was
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making
of an offer in question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the
extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggestedtothe jury by any means, such as making statements or offers of proof
or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors
affecting substantial rights although they were not broughttothe attention of
the court.

Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequencetothe determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted
in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of Ms character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that
the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that
he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge.
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testimony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions, of Rule 703,
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses.

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime.
(a) General rule. For the puipose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited
from him or established by public record during cross-examination but only if
the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year
under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that
the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of
the punishment
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1

I

The bailiff will escort you out via the jury

2

I room.

3

I

4

I please?

5

J

(The jury left the courtroom.)

6

J

(Side bar conference.)

7

I

THE COURT:

8

J excused.

We're taking our noon recess, we'll reconvene at

9

I 1:30.

Mr. Spikes and Ms. Remal will you approach,

Let me just indicate the jury's been

I have asked Mr. Spikes to advise his witnesses that

10

J are in the hall to exercise great caution in not making any

11

I comments in the presence of the jurors, and in waiting to

12

J leave the building until the jurors have done so.

13

J

We're in recess.

14

I

(Noon recess.)

15

I

THE COURT:

16

J back in the matter of State of Utah versus Denny Alvarez,

17

J 911901367.

18

I state is represented, and the jury is not present.

19

J

20

I discussed with me in chambers during the break a matter

21

J pertaining to some anticipated police and law enforcement

22

Let me note for the record that we're

The defendant is present with counsel, the

I will further indicate that counsel has

officer testimony.

Ms. Remal, would you like to put your

23

J position on the record?

24

J

25

I in chambers that I anticipated that Officer Scharman, who

MS. REMAL:

Yes, Your Honor.

I indicated to you
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1

J is one of the state1s witnesses, will be called, and will

2

I be asked to indicate to the jury that at the time that he

3

I apprehended Mr. Alvarez, he asked Mr. Alvarez what his name

4

I was, Mr. Alvarez gave the name of Joseph Madrid.

5

I

6

I preclude the state from asking that particular question

7

I about the false name which Mr. Alvarez gave at that time,

8

J based on Rule 404-B of the rules of evidence, and also on

9

J Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

It is my motion in limine to ask the court to

10

J

404-B indicates that generally evidence of other

11

I crimes and wrongs are not admissible, and I would indicate

12

J to the court that the giving of the false name would be

13

J such a crime or wrong that should not be admissible.

14

J

I would indicate further, and did in chambers,

15

that if the court found under 404-B that the statement was

16

admissible, that I would still ask the court to make a

17

J ruling under 403 which indicates that the court ought to,

18

I basically, balance a piece of evidence as to its prejudice

19

I versus its probative value.

20

J

21

I truth, as the court knows, Mr. Alvarez is on probation for

22

l a robbery pursuant to a motion in limine that we resolved

23

I last week.

24

I including the fact that he's on probation for robbery, is

25

I not admissible.

The reason I have concern about it is that, in

The court ruled that his prior convictions,

But in truth, the explanation that he
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JTL

1

J would give, if allowed, as to why he gave the false name at

2

I the time of being apprehended, was that he was on probation

3

J for a robbery.

4

1

5

I order to explain to the jury why he gave the false name, he

6

I would be forced to reveal to them his prior record, which

7

I the court has already ruled is so prejudicial that it ought

8

J not to be made known to the jury.

9

I

In my opinion, it boxes him in, in a way that, in

So for that reason I ask the court to, under both

10

I rules, 403 and 404-B, to exclude that continuing piece of

11

J evidence.

12

J both those rules it would be admissible, although you have

13

indicated that although you'll allow Mr. Spikes to ask the

It's my understanding that you ruled that under

14

I officer about that statement, that he is not allowed to

15

I cross examine Mr. Alvarez or to ask questions of the

16

J officer as to any further explanation about that.

17

THE COURT:

18

I Spikes, do you wish to be heard?

19

J

20

I basically stated everybodyfs position.

21

J position that it is probative evidence, that we should be

22

I allowed to present that to the jury, that, in fact, he did

23

I give a false name and a false date of birth when confronted

24

I by the police outside of the Smith's.

25

I

MR. SPIKES:

THE COURT:

All right.

Let me just

Mr.

Your Honor, I think Ms. Remal has
It's simply our

How do you feel that this is relevant
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1

J and probative?

2

1

3

I and probative in a couple of areas.

4

I evidence* of guilt if somebody's apprehended and discusses a

5

I matter shortly after an alleged crime has occurred, and

6

I gives a false name and date of birth, I think that's at

7

I least information that should go into the overall equation.

8

I

9

J initially was that Mr. Alvarez was so out of it on drugs

10

I that he wasn't thinking straight, he wasn't in control of

11

J his conduct and behavior.

12

J devious.

13

I

THE COURT:

14

J

MR. SPIKES:

15

I that he gave a different date of birth that resulted in his

MR. SPIKES:

Your Honor, I think it's relevant
One, I think it's

Number two, the hypothesis presented by Ms. Remal

We see this as evidence of being

Motive, and his lack of confusion?
Clearly he was thinking in the sense

16

being treated as a juvenile, and booked in through the

17

juvenile facility, rather than through the adult facility.

18

J

THE COURT:

All right, let me indicate at this

19

J time that I have carefully considered this issue, and I'm

20

I going to find at this point in time that the testimony from

21

J the police officer concerning the defendant's giving of the

22

J false name and date of birth is relevant, that it is

23

probative, and that under the 403 balancing test, which I

24

J have considered and applied, the probative value weighs the

25

J slight, if any, prejudicial effect of the same.

I think
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this is probative to the point that the prosecutor has
brought up.
I will also find under 404-B that this is not
evidence of a crime, as contemplated by 404-B, or a wrong,
as the rule contemplates it.

Certainly he is not charged

with giving false information to a police officer, and the
state is not treating this information in that manner.
However, I111 note for the record that the police
officer whose testimony is the subject of this motion is
present.

I'm going to admonish you at this time, officer,

you are not in any way to mention, regardless of what
question is put to you, the defendants probation status,
the fact that he had any convictions, or that you had any
knowledge at any point in time of a criminal record.

Do

you understand me on that?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes, mafam.

Further, I am going to advise the

state that it is my clear perception that this ruling does
not in any way lock the defendant in.

And as I indicated

in chambers, Ms. Remal, the determination of how you wish
to handle this strategically is up to you.
And I see that there are a number of different
approaches.

One of them is that you donft need to address

this issue.

Secondarily, it seems to tie in with your

theory that the defendant was acting in a confused manner,
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1

J and you don't have to offer any explanation beyond that.

2

1

3

J offer an explanation, I am precluding the state from cross

4

J examining in that area for fear that it will get into this

5

I area of the prior conviction and the probation status. And

6

J I will note for the record that that was the subject of a

7

J pretrial motion.

8

J

9

J my understanding, and it is my order that based upon that

If, however, you choose to have the defendant

However, let me clarify that while it is clearly

10

I there is to be no inquiry into this area of probation

11

I status or prior arrest or conviction, I did not make a

12

J ruling in connection with that.

13

J subject of a stipulated agreement between the parties.

14

J

15

J reviewed the prior conviction, or convictions—I'm not even

16

J clear what conviction or convictions exist—and determined

17

I that under the present case law and rules they were not

18

I appropriate.

19

J

MR. SPIKES: That's correct, Your Honor.

20

I

THE COURT:

21

J sides that that will not come up.

22

J all, including the witness, I do not want a mistrial.

23

I want no mention of arrest, I want no mention of probation,

24

J of anything along those lines.

25

I officer, as to what is fair and what is not under my

Rather, that was the

Itfs my understanding, Mr. Spikes carefully

Is that a fair statement?

So it is clearly understood by both
I want to be clear to
So I

Do you have any questions,
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1

J ruling?

2

MR. SCHARMAN:
THE COURT:

No, Your Honor*

3

J

All right.

If, as the questioning

4

I occurs, you become confused or concerned about how you can

5

I answer a particular question, before you answer, ask for a

6

J recess to give Mr. Spikes an opportunity to confer with

7

J you.

8

I

9

I rights, and it is my clear belief that there is nothing

I do not want to even run the risk of a mistrial.
And again, I want to protect the defendant's

10

J about this ruling that forces the defendant into giving any

11

I explanation as to his probation status.

12

J

Is there anything further, Ms. Remal?

13

I

MS. REMAL:

Nothing further, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right, let's call the jury in.

14
15

I

(The Jury returned to the courtroom, and the

16

J following proceedings were held:)

17

J

18

I back in session in the matter of State of Utah versus

19

I Alvarez.

20

I the defendant and the state, and all of the jurors are

21

I present and accounted for.

22

I

23

I We stand up when you come in, and you stand up when I come

24

J in.

25

J than anyone else, but because of how important our system

THE COURT:

Let the record reflect that we're

Mr. Alvarez is present, as are counsel for both

Ladies and gentlemen, let me just say one thing.

Not because anyone in this courtroom is more important
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were asking such that he could respond?
A

Yes.

Q

And did he, in fact, respond to those questions?

A

Yes, sir, he did*

Q

What name did he give you when you asked him his

name?
A

I believe it was Joseph Madrid, or something of

that nature.
Q

And what date of birth did he give you?

A

I don't recall exactly.

I just recall that the

date of birth, he was a juvenile age.
Q

So what action did you take upon receiving that

information?
A

Because of the nature of the crime, it's policy

dictates for us officers, I took him to the police
department where the SOCO unit photographed him and
fingerprinted him.
Q

Would you indicate what that is?

A

There's officerfs mobile crime labs and so forth

there responsible for fingerprints and photographs and
things of that nature.
Q

Did you know what the ultimate process was?

A

Just that we photographed him and fingerprinted

him, I made contact with an uncle, and then I transported
him to the detention center.
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1 1

Q

Do you know at what point it was determined that

2

I he, in fact, was not Mr. Madrid?

3

1

4

I further foundation.

MS. REMAL:

5

Your Honor, Ifd object without some

THE COURT: Will you lay some additional

6

J foundation, Mr. Spikes?

7

J

8

J discover that the name that he gave you was not, in fact,

9

J his true name?

Q

Did you have occasion to

No, sir, I didn9t, not until I was subpoenaed

10

I

11

I and pulled the case up and read some supplementary reports.

12

I

13

I through that process?

14

I

15

J

16

I based on hearsay, and I'd object unless there's some other

17

J foundation for the answer.

18

J

19

I the information, if he knows.

20

I question, Mr. Spikes.

21

A

(BY MR. SPIKES)

Q

A

And what information did you gather during, or

That the information given to me was not- MS. REMAL:

THE COURT:

Q

Your Honor, it sounds like this is

Well he can give his understanding of

(BY MR. SPIKES)

I111 have you rephrase the

How was it that you, in fact,

22

I found that there was at least some question concerning the

23

J name of Madrid that he gave you?

24

I

A

From a follow-up detective.

25

I

Q

Do you know what process, what procedure was
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1

I taken that would occur to determine that?

2

J

3

J the print I took at the time of the arrest versus some

4

I known prints of the defendant.

5

J

6

I comparison?

7

1

8

I hearsay.

9

A

There was a comparative fingerprint done from

Q

Okay.

Do you know the results of that

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, again I f d object, this is

J

THE COURT:

Overruled, you may answer.

10

J

THE WITNESS:

11

J record that the individual I arrested versus the print of

12

I the other individual were in fact the same.

13

Q

Just I read in the supplementary

(BY MR. SPIKES)

And with respect to the

14

I juvenile status, based on the date of birth of the

15

I individual that you arrested, did you discover additional

16

I information?

17

J

A

That he was an adult, is all.

18

J

Q

Did you gather any other evidence from Mr.

19

J Alvarez at the time that you booked him under the name of

20

Mr. Madrid?

21

I

22

I evidence.

23

I

24

J repeat your answer.

25

A

The knife and the money is what was placed in

THE COURT:

Lean into the microphone, please, and

THE WITNESS:

The knife that was taken out of the
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